Kosovo: Country Profile

In June of 1999 Kosovo emerged from a period of conflict into an environment of significant transition. With the conclusion of hostilities between NATO and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the United Nations launched an international interim administration in the territory. Given the decade of repression of the ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo by the Belgrade government, and the violence exhibited during the conflict that had developed since 1995, and the displacement crises of 1998 and during the NATO armed action, ethnic relations were extremely volatile. Indeed, revenge attacks against ethnic Serbs and other groups supposedly associated with Serb rule had led to their displacement in significant numbers and to the destruction of property. Remaining minority populations were confined to enclaves, isolated and under threat of attack should they venture outside of certain protected areas. Distrust among the ethnic groups was great.

The ethnic composition of Kosovo is still up for debate.  There is a general consensus on the approximate percentage of each ethnic community, but given that a reliable census has not been conducted since 1981 (the census undertaken in 1991 was boycotted by Albanians), inferences have been made by the international community through independent polls since 1999, but numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remains a controversial issue. The UN and World Bank estimated that the population was between 1.75 and 2.24 million in 1998 – made more unclear during the 1998-99 conflict. Approximately 800,000 Albanians fled to Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, with potentially another half a million being internally displaced. Current information also mentions the presence of Bosniaks, Croatians, Roma, Ashkalija, and Egyptians living in Kosovo.

Kosovo’s population has been around 90% Albanian since the beginning of the 20th century. Serb exoduses in 1690 and 1739 put an end to the centuries-lasting Serb majority. Although the Serb population increased through the 1920’s re-colonisation efforts, the Albanian population boom triggered another emigration wave among Serbs in the 1960s, in the course of which the Serbian population shrank to 10-15% by the late 1990s. In 1999 approximately another 100,000 Serbs left Kosovo.

Kosovo represents the historical cradle of the Albanian national renaissance, as well as the heart of Serbian national mythology which has been immortalised in countless tales and folklore ranks around the Ottoman defeat of the Serbian at Kosovo Polje in 1389. Both Albanians and Serbs claim historical right to the province, and this centuries-old conflict still affects political developments today.

Since 1999, after Kosovo became a UN protectorate under UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) through UNSC resolution 1244, there have been five special representatives of the UN Secretary-General. The failure to define Kosovo’s status and a premature donor withdrawal saw a slide from the beginning reconstruction boom into recession in 2003, with unemployment standing at around 60%.

In April 2002 UNMIK proclaimed its policy “standards before status‿ for Kosovo, with the aim of taking some pressure from the question of independence. The Contact Group which re-engaged in 2003, brought this policy to life by announcing that the final status review could begin in mid-2005 if governance and inter-ethnic accommodation benchmarks were met.

In March 2004, inter-ethnic tensions exploded: Kosovo Albanian riots targeted the Serb population and UNMIK. Unfounded allegations of Serbs drowning Albanian children in Mitrovica, sparked 2 days of Kosovo-wide riots that killed 19 and wounded 900. The March events were assessed by Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade as the culmination of a process of forcing Serbs out of Kosovo, particularly from all major towns, thus limiting their presence to scattered village populations, with the exception of the north. There is a strong feeling among Serbs and other minority populations of having been abandoned by the international community and left unprotected, in spite of a significant military and civilian presence. Their confidence has been shattered.

Belgrade presented a plan for expanding and formally detaching Serb areas from PISG authority in April 2004. Declining to adopt Belgrade’s plan, the Contact Group nevertheless demanded that the PISG agree to decentralize the Kosovo government. The majority of Kosovo Serbs, after the March 2004 events, did not participate in the work of the PISG any more and conditioned their re-engagement with demands related to reconstruction and returns, prosecution of the perpetrators, security and the development of local government reform. However, Serb politicians realized that the international community was now listening more attentively to their concerns and that remaining outside the political process could put this attention and the support they now enjoy from the international community at risk, particularly when their Kosovo Albanian counterparts are seen to take steps to accommodate their demands.

The elections in October 2004 forged a new narrow governing coalition between Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) party, with Haradinaj appointed Prime Minister. Hashim Thaci’s PDK was consigned to opposition.

Indeed, following political stagnation and widespread frustration, Kosovo has entered a new period of dynamic development. A political process is underway and is gaining momentum. It is based on a comprehensive political strategy, which includes the prospects for a future status process.

With the publication of the Report of Special Envoy of UN Secretary General, Kai Eide, in early October 2005, however, status talks seem to be deferred again. The report, a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Kosovo, disclosed an uneven standard implementation process. While particular progress has been made in the development of new institutional frameworks, with a comprehensive set of institutions having been established, including executive, legislative, and judicial bodies at the central as well as the local levels, and much progress has been achieved in the development of a sustainable legal framework, the development of new institutions is undermined by a strong tendency among politicians to see themselves as accountable to their political parties rather than to the public they serve. Appointments are, therefore, regularly made on the basis of political and clan affiliation rather than competence.

Rule of law is hampered by a lack of ability and readiness to enforce legislation at all levels. Respect for rule of law is inadequately entrenched and the mechanisms to enforce it are not sufficiently developed.

Organized crime and corruption have been characterized as the biggest threats to Kosovo’s stability and the sustainability of its institutions. These are widespread phenomena, but the level is difficult to assess. The Government has not taken the necessary administrative and legislative action to fight organized crime and prevent corruption in provisional institutions.

With regard to the foundations for a multi-ethnic society the situation is grim. The overall security situation is stable, but fragile. On the ground, the situation is complex and troubling, especially for minority communities. There are frequently unreported cases of low-level, inter-ethnic violence and incidents.

With regard to the economy, significant progress has been made. Economic structures have been established and modern legislation exists in many essential areas. Nevertheless, the current economic situation remains bleak. The unemployment rate is still high and poverty is widespread. Grave problems exist with regard to lack of public income as well as an antiquated energy sector.

The World Bank’s Poverty Assessment says 37 percent of Kosovo’s population is classified as “poor�, living on less than €1.42 per day. 15 percent are below the extreme (food) poverty line of €0.93 per day.

Income poverty, however, is not spread evenly across all households and individuals. Children, the elderly, female-headed households, the disabled, non-Serb ethnic minorities, the unemployed and precarious job holders are the groups most at risk.  However, inroads into reducing income poverty can be achieved. Poverty in Kosovo is shallow, meaning that the poor are close to the thresholds that classify them as such. These findings are based on the 2002 Household Budget Survey from the Statistical Office of Kosovo.