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## KOSOVO'S UNEASY COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE IN 2016 AND HOW TO RENEW THE COMMUNITY AGENDA DURING 2017

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Following the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) formed a government coalition, along with a number of junior minority political parties. Since taking over the government of Kosovo in late 2014, the coalition led by Prime Minister Isa Mustafa has experienced difficult and rowdy times as it tried to deliver on the most difficult political agenda in Kosovo's history as an independent state: making constitutional changes for the establishment of Specialist Chambers for War Crimes, meeting conditions for visa free travel to the EU, in particular border demarcation with Montenegro, and implementing agreements reached within the framework of the Brussels Dialogue with Serbia, not to mention tackling a myriad of social and economic issues facing Kosovo. From the outset, the coalition government was met with significant resistance from opposition parties, chiefly from *Lëvizja Vetëvendosje* (Movement for Self-Determination) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by ex-Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, who challenged its legitimacy and called for new elections ever since its establishment in late 2014.

The coalition also faced internal disagreements and fierce opposition over major issues concerning communities: the transformation of Kosovo Security Forces into a Kosovo Army, the Trepça/Trepča law, the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the gradual establishment of Kosovo institutions in the northern municipalities and many challenges of their operation. Against the background of these challenges, the government's relation with its Serb coalition partner *Srpska lista*, believed to have been formed by Serbia and whose leaders are considered to have little to no decision-making powers without Serbia's consent<sup>1</sup>, has been very difficult from the outset with the situation completely deteriorating towards the end of the year.

Notwithstanding this challenging backdrop, Kosovo experienced impressive year-to-year GDP growth of 4%, gained membership in important international and sports

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<sup>1</sup> Bodo Weder, 'Progress Undone? Trading Democracy for Solving the Status Dispute in Kosovo', pp. 12-14, November 2015. Available here: [http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/DPC\\_Policy\\_Paper\\_Trading\\_Democracy\\_in\\_Kosovo.pdf](http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/DPC_Policy_Paper_Trading_Democracy_in_Kosovo.pdf)

organizations, and continued to invest significant funds and resources for the development of its four northern municipalities with a predominantly Kosovo Serb population.

The following is a short summary of major developments that have marked 2016 concerning governance of community issues in Kosovo. It ends with a list of recommendations for the government and other stakeholders involved in Kosovo, namely the EU and the US, that should revitalize Kosovo's community agenda.

### ***Srpska lista*: between Kosovo and Serbia**

*Srpska lista* is a coalition of Serb parties under a unified list arranged and backed by the government of the Republic of Serbia. The coalition includes also representatives of other minority communities in Kosovo, namely Adem Hodža representing the Gorani community.<sup>2</sup>*Srpska lista* emerged victorious among the Serb community following local and parliamentary elections held in 2013 and 2014, respectively. It gained nine out of ten guaranteed seats for the Serb community in the Parliament,<sup>3</sup>and also won the vast majority of mayoral/municipal assembly elections (Shtërpçë/Štrpce being the exception, although its mayor later joined *Srpska lista*). This decisive victory, though expected following clear and vocal support for the party by Serbia, marked a drastic shift in the Kosovo Serb political scene, which up to that point had been led by Serb leaders who came to prominence by way of engaging with Kosovo institutions and consequently were much more prone to cooperation with them.

As per Kosovo's constitutional provisions on guaranteed minority representation in government, *Srpska lista* party representatives were appointed to a significant number of government positions, including the powerful positions of Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for the Local Self Government and Minister of Returns and Communities, as well as several crucial deputy ministerial and other high ranking positions.<sup>4</sup>Although this position seemingly gives the party a strong position for impacting policy- and decision-making at the central and local level, because of its close relations with Belgrade, the relationship with Albanian parties in the government has been a very difficult one. A series of controversial statements and public appearances alongside senior politicians from Serbia during events deemed to be detrimental to Kosovo's statehood, deteriorated the relationship between *Srpska lista* and the government,

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<sup>2</sup> Hodža was recently dismissed from the coalition following internal divisions regarding the dismissal of Minister Ljubomir Marić

([http://kossev.info/strana/arhiva/srpska\\_nenad\\_rasic\\_i\\_adem\\_hodza\\_do\\_daljnjeg\\_iskljuceni\\_iz\\_poslanickog\\_kluba/10716](http://kossev.info/strana/arhiva/srpska_nenad_rasic_i_adem_hodza_do_daljnjeg_iskljuceni_iz_poslanickog_kluba/10716)).

<sup>3</sup> The one MP who at the time of the elections ran independent of *Srpska lista*, Nenad Rašić; later joined the list, to be again expelled from the party in the wake of the recent division within the list following the dismissal of Minister Marić ([http://kossev.info/strana/arhiva/srpska\\_nenad\\_rasic\\_i\\_adem\\_hodza\\_do\\_daljnjeg\\_iskljuceni\\_iz\\_poslanickog\\_kluba/10716](http://kossev.info/strana/arhiva/srpska_nenad_rasic_i_adem_hodza_do_daljnjeg_iskljuceni_iz_poslanickog_kluba/10716)).

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.dw.com/en/kosovo-chooses-new-government-after-six-month-stalemate/a-18119560>

and exposed the government to major criticism by the opposition and the public opinion.

With the process of forming the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities stalled by the middle of 2016 (for more on the Association see the next Chapter), the situation worsened when in October, the government adopted the Laws on Trepça/Trepča and on Strategic Investments and hastily pushed them through parliament, particularly the Law on Trepça/Trepča. The laws were not considered of *vital interest* to the communities and hence did not follow the *vital interest* procedures in the parliament (which requires a double majority, that is, not only a simple majority in the parliament, but also a majority of parties that represent communities). *Srpska lista* criticized the laws strongly for not taking into account the position of the Serb community in Kosovo. In a unique show of wanting to use the Kosovo institutions to advance their position, *Srpska lista* challenged the Law on Trepça/Trepča and several other laws and administrative instructions at the Constitutional Court of Kosovo.<sup>5</sup> The Court issued a verdict on 31 October, rejecting the argument that these laws are a violation of the Constitution, and noted that the laws, and specifically the Law on Trepça/Trepča, “is constitutional as regards its substance and the procedure followed for its adoption by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo.”<sup>6</sup>

This development represented a lost opportunity both for the government and *Srpska lista* to work on these issues jointly in an effort to overcome differences. As a result, beginning in November, *Srpska lista* officially froze all relations with the government of Kosovo. Earlier that month, Minister for Local Self-Government Administration, Ljubomir Marić, was seen alongside Marko Đurić, Director of the Serbian “Office for Kosovo and Metohija”, after the latter had circumvented his travel ban to Kosovo via unofficial channels. Marić’s presence there was widely criticized by opposition parties and received extensive coverage in Kosovo media.<sup>7</sup> Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Mustafa dismissed Marić. It appeared later that this was done in agreement with at least a part of *Srpska lista*, namely those MPs that belong to the Socialist Movement of Serbian Minister Aleksandar Vulin.<sup>8</sup> These MPs also returned to the Kosovo parliament. Mustafa replaced Marić with Mirjana Jevtić, former Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Welfare.<sup>9</sup> Jevtić’s appointment proved to be somewhat controversial, however, as certain parts of the *Srpska lista* coalition—especially members of Serbia’s ruling Progressive Party, including Marić and Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanović—publicly stated they do not agree with that decision. On 26 December 2016, all *Srpska*

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2016&mm=10&dd=18&nav\\_category=640&nav\\_id=1189339](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2016&mm=10&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id=1189339)

<sup>6</sup> CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO, [Case No. KOu8/16](#) (31 October 2016), “Resolution on Inadmissibility”, p.15.

<sup>7</sup> <http://lajmi.net/lajmi-fundit-kryeministri-mustafa-shkarkon-ministrin-lubomir-maric/>

<sup>8</sup> For a good understanding, Kosovo Serb politicians as a rule also belong to Serbian parties. One wing belongs to Vulin’s Socialist Movement, another wing belongs to the Progressive Party of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. Although the Socialist Movement and the Progressive Party are coalition partners in Serbia and in Kosovo (as parts of *Srpska lista*), relations between both wings have been strained.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.balkaneu.com/prime-minister-mustafa-discharges-minister-lubomir-maric/>

*lista* MPs in the Kosovo parliament were called for an emergency meeting with the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. Following the meeting, both Vučić and certain *Srpska lista* MPs issued strong statements and ultimatums directed at the government of Kosovo, calling on Minister Jevtić to immediately resign from her position and urging the Kosovo government to commence with the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities.<sup>10</sup> Marko Đurić said that Kosovo Serbs would proceed to “establish the Association themselves” if Kosovo failed to do so by 15 February 2017.<sup>11</sup> Jevtić promptly resigned as Minister and *Srpska lista* again closed its ranks in boycotting the work of the Kosovo government and parliament.<sup>12</sup>

## **The Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities: The impasse continues**

*Srpska lista* continuously frames the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities as an institution that will guarantee the survival of the Kosovo Serb community within Kosovo, and thus declares it to be an issue of primordial importance for the Serb community that should be resolved before any other matters can be tackled.<sup>13</sup> In this, it is backed by Serbia, which in 2013 signed an Agreement with Kosovo within the EU-mediated Brussels Dialogue which foresaw the establishment of an association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo as a mechanism to strengthen local self-government autonomy.<sup>14</sup> The Association/Community proved to be a contentious issue, however, and several attempts at coming up with a draft statute failed due to strong disagreements over its mandate and expected competences. There is also strong opposition within the Parliament and among opposition parties. A number of MPs lodged a request with the Constitutional Court in 2015 over the nature and constitutionality of the Association. The Court found that, while the initial agreement of April 2013 is a legal obligation for the Kosovo government, the second agreement of August 2015 detailing the general principles behind the Association includes a number of elements that are not in line with the Kosovo constitution. The Court stressed that the Association/Community must respect the multi-ethnic character of the state and that it is an exercise of local self-governance first and foremost.<sup>15</sup> The government pledged to respect the decision of the Court, and claimed any Statute would need to adhere to this interpretation.

*Srpska lista* does not agree with this approach and publicly calls upon the government to go ahead with the establishment of the Association/Community along the lines of

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/lista-srpska-leterultimatum-kryeministrit-mustafa-shkarkojeni-ministren-jevtiq-299759/>

<sup>11</sup> The date is not coincidental, coinciding with Serbian Statehood Day. <http://koha.net/?id=27&l=150277>

<sup>12</sup> [http://kossev.info/strana/ahiva/mirjana\\_jevtic\\_podnela\\_ostavku/10786](http://kossev.info/strana/ahiva/mirjana_jevtic_podnela_ostavku/10786)

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/beograd-blizi-pristini-nego-srpska-zajednica-na-kosovu/26735429.html>

<sup>14</sup> “First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations”, 19 April 2013.

<sup>15</sup> For an overview of the decision of the Court, refer to ECMI Kosovo, ‘[The Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities](#)’ (28 January 2016).

the second agreement. It also lodged complaints over the Laws on Trepça/Trepča and the Law on Strategic Investments, which it claimed were designed to hinder the establishment of the Association/Community.<sup>16</sup> While the Court rejected these complaints, *Srpska lista* continued to pressure its coalition partners to adopt the Statute of the Association/Community paving the way for its establishment.

During the summer period, the EU listed the ratification of border demarcation with Montenegro as one of the conditions for Kosovo to gain visa-free travel to the EU. As a result, the already contentious border demarcation quickly became a top political priority for Kosovo. The two issues, border demarcation and the expected establishment of the Association/Community, became opposition launch pads against the government, resulting in a period of some three months of skirmishes in the parliament ensued between the opposition and the governing coalition. During this period, all minority communities, including *Srpska lista*, generally stood on the sidelines. The sharp divisions within Kosovo politics and society had the net effect of the Association being pushed back on the political agenda.

### Positive Developments during the Year

In a year marked with serious challenges to the stability and governability of the state, there were some positive developments which showcase a gradual shift in attitude related to integration and cooperation between institutions and minority communities, particularly Kosovo Serbs.

The four northern municipalities (Severna Mitrovica/Mitrovicë e Veriut, Zubin Potok, Leposavić/Leposaviq, and Zvečan/Zveçan) took part in municipal elections back in June of 2014, electing mayors and municipal assemblies. These elections marked the first time that citizens from these four municipalities went to the polls organized by Kosovo's Central Election Commission. The difficult task of integration and cooperation, however, was marked with some disagreements over municipal budgets and competences early on. During 2015–2016, these four municipalities increased their contacts with the Ministry of Local Governance Administration (MLGA), and the budgets they adopted were in line with the Law on Local Self-Governance and central-level regulations on municipal budgets. The government of Kosovo, in line with requests from municipalities, provided funds for services and infrastructure needs in accordance with their population size and identified needs. A total of 14,474,233 euros were provided by the government of Kosovo for capital expenditure projects in these four municipalities during 2016, not including direct investments from line ministries on regional roads, transport, infrastructure, etc.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2016&mm=10&dd=18&nav\\_category=640&nav\\_id=1189339](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2016&mm=10&dd=18&nav_category=640&nav_id=1189339)

<sup>17</sup> LAW NR. 05/L-109 ON AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING THE LAW NO. 05/L-071 ON BUDGET OF REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO FOR THE YEAR 2016, 14 JULY 2016.

The Development Fund for the North, established in an effort to provide additional funds for infrastructure and socio-economic projects in the four northern municipalities from taxes and other customs fees collected at the northern border gates, continued to provide significant funding for these municipalities. By the middle of 2016, a total of ten million euros had been collected and accrued in the Development Fund, of which more than 7 million had been disbursed to the northern municipalities for their capital and socio-economic needs.<sup>18</sup>

Separately, international donors have also continued to invest considerable sums of money in the four northern municipalities over these last years. The European Union, the largest bilateral donor in Kosovo since 1999, has invested some 54.5 million euros, covering 124 projects since 2010 in a range of fields such as economic development, agriculture, non-governmental organizations, and infrastructure.<sup>19</sup> Beginning in 2013, the European Union started to directly support local governments in the north through two grant schemes designed to improve economic and infrastructural development: Grant Scheme for the North I and Grant Scheme for the North II. Through these two schemes, the European Union has provided 9,503,637 euros for a total of 79 municipal development projects.<sup>20</sup>

Even though they receive very limited attention, these examples of socio-economic cooperation between local governments with a Kosovo Serb majority in the North of Kosovo and Kosovo and international institutions present important developments in the process of integration in Kosovo local governance mechanisms, economy and society. The recent controversies over the building of a “wall” (Kosovo Serb politicians claiming it to be a mere technical solution for foundation purposes and, later, part of a structure for public happenings) at the northern side of the bridge over the Ibër/Ibar river in Mitrovicë/a, anticipating the opening of the bridge after more than 15 years of barricades, shows, however, how fragile this process continues to be.

President Hashim Thaçi’s visits to the memorials of Kosovo Serb civilian victims of the Kosovo War in Gračanica/Graçanicë and Pejë/Peć, represent an important step as Kosovo’s institutional leaders increase their efforts to reach out to all civilian victims of the war. While President Thaçi’s visits did not pass without some criticism from opposition parties and civil society, suspecting his move to be calculated in anticipation of potential accusations by the Specialist Chambers for War Crimes, the overall atmosphere and tone was rather subdued and free of all-to-obvious politicization. President Thaçi’s visits represent an important milestone in the development of an inclusive and all-encompassing society, wherein all innocent civilian victims are honored, and their memory kept alive. This is an important message for all minority

<sup>18</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/7235/700000-euro-awarded-to-two-projects-in-northern-kosovo-municipalities-from-development-fund\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/7235/700000-euro-awarded-to-two-projects-in-northern-kosovo-municipalities-from-development-fund_en)

<sup>19</sup> INSTITUT ZA TERITORIJALNI EKONOMSKI RAZVOJ (INTER) AND RTV MIR, ‘[Da li živimo bolje? Efekti ulaganja na severu Kosova nakon potpisivanja Briselskog sporazuma](#)’ (June 2016).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

communities that Kosovo's institutions are ready and willing to honor and remember their family members and friends as well, in addition to those belonging to the majority.

Finally, the government of Kosovo has started a process to verify diplomas held by graduates of the University of Mitrovica/ë North for the purpose of job applications in public institutions or professional exams offered by Kosovo's public institutions. For this purpose, the government has formed a Commission mandated to verify and certify these diplomas, of which some 170 have been verified and graduates issued with certificates. This development was based on the initiative of the government and was concludes solely based on facilitation by local actors. It by-passed entirely the Brussels Dialogue process, demonstrating that much can be done when local actors, including the government, take the initiative.

In line with the Brussels agreement on the judiciary, the integration of the judiciary system previously run by Serbia in northern Kosovo to the Kosovo-run judiciary system is progressing. Judges, prosecutors, and support staff have been selected, and initial logistical preparations for underway. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent recent political developments will affect the completion of this important process. One major obstacle that may delay the process is Serbia's failure to adopt the necessary legal changes to its laws on the judiciary to absolve these judges, prosecutors and support staff from their duties within the parallel judicial system run by Serbia.

### **Renewing the Community Agenda during 2017**

Fundamental disagreements between the two Albanian coalition partners, PDK and LDK, with *Srpska lista* have seriously impeded the work of the government and have slowed down the implementation of its heavy agenda, particularly as it relates to major pieces of legislation such as the border demarcation with Montenegro and the establishment of the Association/Community. In addition, the Brussels Dialogue is in an obvious crisis. Not only does the implementation of agreements run slow, the very purpose and mechanism behind the Dialogue are put in question. This impasse may signal that is it time to take stock of developments and come to an agreement over the future of political cooperation between Kosovo Albanian and Serb political representatives within Kosovo and the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In that vein, ECMI Kosovo would like to recommend the following:

- Ever since the formation of the government in late 2014, there have been constant public controversies over the allegiances of Kosovo Serb Ministers and other high public officials. They have often been seen accompanying Serbian political representatives in Kosovo and they regularly travel to Belgrade for meetings with the Serbian Prime Minister. This creates a major turmoil in the Kosovo political scene and among the public, as Kosovo Serb political leaders are seen as double-dealing. There need to be clear rules of engagement for these issues. ECMI Kosovo previously signaled this issue after the

government had just been formed, but the problem has only aggravated. Government ministers and other public officials should be cognizant of the need to distinguish between their statements in their official capacity as ministers and officials, and their political positions as party leaders or members.<sup>21</sup>

- Kosovo, Serbia and the EU must evaluate and reconfirm a basic set of minimum principles underlying the Brussels Dialogue. These minimum principles should define the Brussels Dialogue as a mechanism to simplify and streamline disagreements over an agreed-upon set of issues between Kosovo and Serbia. It should be adhered to by each side in order to avoid situations wherein every new agreement is disputed on grounds of sovereignty, leading to long delays and/or new agreements intended to clarify the initial agreement.
- *Srpska lista*, and all other minority communities and their representatives in Parliament and government, should continue to make use of various institutions and mechanisms, such as the Constitutional Court and the Vital Interest clause in the Constitution, to protect and promote their rights as guaranteed by law.
- The establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities is at an impasse, and neither side is willing to budge from its position. Kosovo insists that the Association/Community cannot be established while Serbia keeps funding illegal parallel structures and does nothing to dismantle them. Serbia and Kosovo Serb political representatives counter that the Association/Community is vital to the survival of the Kosovo Serb community in Kosovo and that it should be established before any other issue can be tackled. ECMI Kosovo conducted a research study into possible models for the Association/Community aimed at improving the provision of services at the local level through an association of Serb majority municipalities<sup>22</sup>:
  - The Association should be framed as an exercise in inter-municipal cooperation, in the spirit of Kosovo’s governmental set-up, which provides for far-reaching local self-government and inter-municipal cooperation as a mechanism to promote and protect the rights of communities in Kosovo while guaranteeing the functionality of the Kosovan state.
  - Participating municipalities remain the basic units of local self-government and should establish accountability mechanisms to check and follow-up on the work of the Association and have the opportunity to withdraw from the Association at any stage.
  - The Association should be an inter-municipal body with the legal status of an association according to Kosovo law. It will coordinate the interests of the participating municipalities in the domains of local

<sup>21</sup>ECMI Kosovo, [‘Forging a Working Environment within the Government of Kosovo’](#) (18 January 2015).

<sup>22</sup>ECMI KOSOVO & PAX FOR PEACE, [‘The Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities: Breaking the Impasse’](#) (June 2016).



democracy, local economy, education, primary and secondary health and social care; urban and rural planning, local living conditions for returnees to Kosovo, research and development, and culture.

- The participating municipalities should establish joint public institutions for jointly exercising competences of the municipalities when it comes to Serbian-language education, health and social care, and culture, in line with relevant provisions of the Law on Inter-Municipal Cooperation. These joint public institutions will be closely related to, but independent of the inter-municipal Association.

- The Association's upward impact on central level government should be limited and integrated into existing mechanisms for community representation at the central level, particularly the Consultative Council for Communities.

- The Government of Kosovo and international donors should maintain their current levels of investment in Serb-majority municipalities, and in particular in the four northern municipalities, as this investment has proven to be quite successful in not only enhancing the development and socio-economic conditions of Kosovo citizens there, but in fostering cooperation and communication between the local and central level institutions in Kosovo.
- Local elections set to be held during 2017 will provide an opportunity for all citizens to cast their votes for their local governments and to express their needs and concerns to those running for public office. Minority communities, and in particular those in the four northern municipalities, should build upon their considerable participation during last local elections held in 2013 (over 20% participation following more than a decade of close to zero participation), and take part in these elections in even greater numbers strengthening their voice in relation to elected representatives at the local level and central level.
- In the midst of a very difficult political agenda, the non-issue of border demarcation with Montenegro suddenly became one of the most divisive political and public issues of 2016, with wide reaching consequences on other more pressing and important issues for Kosovo. Up to this point, there has never been any dispute of border with Montenegro. The EU's decision to list it as a precondition for visa liberalization at this point of time in Kosovo development as it tries to normalize relations with Serbia has been counter-effective and out of perspective. This year, the EU provided visa liberalization to countries with much larger and pressing border issues. ECMI Kosovo has commissioned a legal expert on this issue, who came up with the following ways out of the current stalemate, each of which have their pros and cons: 1) to disown the agreement and seek a new demarcation process, which might jeopardize friendly relations with Montenegro, 2) to seek international arbitration, to which Montenegro would need to agree, and 3) to have a "user agreement" with Montenegro, with the latter agreeing to a 'soft' administration of the area covered by

demarcation.<sup>23</sup> We strongly recommend that this issue is dealt with as a provisional agreement between the two governments, reached in good faith, with clear principles of how to deal with this issue at a later stage of developments. This agreement should close this unnecessary chapter that has poisoned developments in Kosovo during 2016.

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<sup>23</sup> Professor Marc Weller, “The validity of the Boundary between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Montenegro as Determined by the Boundary Demarcation Performed by the State Commission for Marking and Maintaining the State Border and Reflected in the Vienna Agreement of 26 August 2015”, University of Cambridge, 30 August 2016.

**Further reports and political analysis:**

[The Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities – Breaking the impasse](#)

**June 2016**

[The Constitutional Court’s Decision On The Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities](#)

**28 January 2016**

[The Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities: Obligation or Opportunity?](#)

**17 December 2015**

[Repeated Incidents in Goraždevac / Gorazhdec: Prompt Action Required](#)

**10 December, 2015**

[Is the Minority Quota System in Higher Education Being Abused?](#)

**October 15, 2015**

[For An Inclusive Discussion On The Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities](#)

**October 8, 2015**

[The New Agreement on the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities: An Important Step Forward, But Not the Final Word](#)

**September 7, 2015**

[Disagreements Surrounding the Use of Languages and the Poor Implementation of the Legal Framework](#)

**August 2, 2015**

[Human Rights Laws Package Enters into Force](#)

**July 26, 2015**

[On the Worrisome Trend of Incidents Directed at the Serb Community in the Pejë/Peć and Klinë/Klina Area](#)

**July 19, 2015**

[Vidovdan: No News is Good News](#)

**July 3, 2015**

[On the Recent Security Incidents in Klinë/Klina and the Difficult Return Process](#)

**May 21, 2015**

[The Gorani Holiday on 6 May: A Missed Opportunity for the Kosovo Institutions](#)

**May 14, 2015**

*Through the **Kosovo Communities Issues Monitor**, ECMI Kosovo monitors, analyses, and provides recommendations on developments and concerns related to the position of minority communities in Kosovo, within the framework of international and domestic minority rights legislation. The analyses presented in the Monitor rely on close monitoring of media and interviews with relative stakeholders. While ECMI Kosovo strives at all times to provide accurate and nuanced information and to present the views and perceptions of all sides, the objective of the Monitor is not to provide journalist or factual coverage, but to offer an additional analytical element to the debate, reflecting ECMI Kosovo’s longstanding experience with communities issues in Kosovo and the domestic and international legal framework in place.*